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William Godwin and the Puritan Legacy 
 
In the debates occasioned by the outbreak of the French Revolution one contribution, 
though relatively neglected today, was accorded preeminent status. This was erstwhile 
Dissenting or Nonconformist minister William Godwin‟s anarchist critique of ancien 
régime Britain, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793).1 As Godwin‟s fellow 
Nonconformist William Hazlitt later famously remarked, compared with Godwin, 
Edmund Burke was considered merely a “flashy sophist” and Tom Paine, “Tom Fool”.2 
Godwin scholars now agree that the moral and political philosophy of Political Justice 
was heavily indebted to its author‟s immersion in the culture of Rational Dissent;3 and 
more recent work has begun to uncover the extent to which Godwin‟s later, less-studied 
writings represent a reappraisal and even repudiation of the philosopher‟s “puritan” 
religious heritage.4  
This essay‟s analysis of Godwin‟s engagement with his (and Britain‟s) puritan and 
Dissenting legacy is significant in two respects. First, it offers a reading of two of 
Godwin‟s lesser known, later writings and thus contributes to our appreciation of a 
thinker whose activity and influence in the nineteenth century is still poorly understood.5 
Second, this topic offers a unique point of entry into the bewildering complex of 
religious, political and historiographical tensions comprising the intersection of Britain‟s 
long eighteenth and long nineteenth centuries. This pivotal period saw the emergence 
of a radically reformed British polity, an important element of which addressed long-
standing issues of religious profession and allegiance. In this context, it is surely helpful 
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to engage the extensive historical reflections of one of English letters‟ most productive 
and generically versatile practitioners. 
Thanks to the work of J. C. D. Clark, we are all now well aware of the extent to which 
ancien régime England was a “confessional” state fundamentally defined by its 
repudiation and exclusion of Protestant Nonconformity.6 A crucial moment in the 
formation of the identity and public perception of English Dissent was, of course, the 
Civil War period of the 1640s and 1650s. Yet Godwin was not directly to address this 
formative period in Dissenting history until 1815, when, after a decade of mostly 
pseudonymous writing, he published Lives of Edward and John Philips, Nephews and 
Pupils of Milton, obviously a rehearsal for his later History of the Commonwealth of 
England (1824-28).7 Lives of Milton’s Nephews marks the onset of an interest in the 
seventeenth century which was to prove Godwin‟s central literary preoccupation over 
the next 15 years.8 With a particular focus on the novel Mandeville: A Tale of the 
Seventeenth Century in England (1817)9 and History of the Commonwealth, this essay 
pursues Godwin‟s wide-ranging and hitherto understudied interrogation of the historical 
and philosophical meaning of seventeenth century puritanism in terms of his own 
intellectual development and the shifting discursive contexts of the early nineteenth 
century. Before engaging with these key nineteenth century texts, however, it is firstly 
necessary to establish the nature and discursive situation of Godwin‟s significant earlier 
writings. 
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I 
In his collection of essays, The Enquirer: Reflections on Education, Manners and 
Literature (1797), Godwin briefly, if unequivocally, broke his early silence on the 
revolutionary events of the seventeenth century: 
 The period of the Stuarts is the only portion of our history interesting to the heart 
of man. Yet its noblest virtues are obscured by the vile jargon of fanaticism and 
hypocrisy. From the moment that the grand contest excited under the Stuarts was 
quieted by the Revolution [of 1688], our history assumes its most insipid and 
insufferable form. It is the history of negotiations and tricks, it is the history of revenues 
and debts; it is the history of corruption and political profligacy; but it is not the history of 
genuine, independent man.10  
Such a perception contrasted starkly with that of the majority of Godwin‟s compatriots 
for whom Britain providentially enjoyed a sane via media between the abortive Puritan 
republicanism and antinomianism of the seventeenth century Interregnum and the 
despotic, crypto-Catholicism extinguished by the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The 
historiographical cheerleader for this view was David Hume whose sceptical and 
conservative History of England (1754-62) actually increased in popularity in the early 
decades of the nineteenth century.11 Within this “restoration „politics of culture‟”12 
characteristic of the long eighteenth century Protestant Dissenters, as well as Roman 
Catholics, were considered imperfectly patriotic and ultimately untrustworthy.13 And 
although mainstream prejudice against Protestant Nonconformity waned across the 
eighteenth century it was reignited by the debate over the French Revolution, 
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specifically, by Edmund Burke‟s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).14 
Therein, Burke painted contemporary Dissent as a manifestation of an extreme form of 
rationalistic Protestantism which, like the forms of natural religion championed by the 
leaders of revolutionary France, would result in the destruction of Christianity, 
civilization and social order in Europe.15 Revolution and reaction thus seriously set back 
the burgeoning cause of Dissenting emancipation.16 As late as 1818, Hazlitt was to 
remark that the Dissenter was still considered a “half-Englishman…a secret disturber of 
the peace, a dark conspirator against the State.”17 In the first decades of the long 
nineteenth century, then, the Dissenting tradition so crucial to Godwin‟s philosophical 
identity was mostly denied its historiographical expression precisely because it 
constituted a necessary and defining Other to a mainstream British identity threatened 
by a variety of foreign and domestic revolutionaries. 
Godwin‟s Political Justice was conceived as a direct response to Burke.18 It proposed 
that the moral and intellectual independence characteristic of the Rational Dissenter 
ought to be the basis and end of the ideal political society. In trusting solely to their 
reason and eschewing irrational traditions, instincts and the delusive promptings of the 
senses, individuals were bound to reject medieval forms of government such as 
monarchy and aristocracy, institutions which inculcated dubious human qualities in their 
subjects. Godwin argued that the widespread operation of independent ratiocination 
would inevitably sweep away this corrupt ancien régime and replace it with a democratic 
(and ultimately an anarchist) polity characterized by intellectual autonomy, public spirit 
and benevolence.19 This argument was underpinned by a typical (though mostly tacit) 
Protestant, rationalist historiography which saw intellectual liberty, enlightenment and 
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democracy as inevitable and salutary consequences of the Reformation‟s destruction of 
Catholic superstition and intellectual despotism.20 Unlike Burke, for whom an emotional 
attachment to tradition nurtured and necessitated religious activity, Godwin saw 
intellectual autonomy or rational independence as the essence of true religion21 and, by 
extension, the basis and guarantee of a just political society.22 
In reaction to the French Revolution and the wars which issued from it, popular opinion 
tended to side very much with Burkean conservatism against the rationalism and 
republicanism of enlightened philosophes like Godwin. Partly in response to this 
criticism and partly as a consequence of his own independent intellectual maturation, 
Godwin came to revise the message of Political Justice. In later editions of 1796 and 
1798 he continued to assert the moral poverty of monarchical and aristocratic political 
institutions but stressed, confusingly, that humanity was as likely to be productively 
motivated by habit, instinct and emotion as it was by reason and that personal felicity 
and social progress consisted both in the rational individual disengaging himself from 
social life and having his sensibility continually modified by sympathetic contact with 
others.23 As Mark Philp has shown, the complexity and occasional contradictory nature 
of the final edition of Political Justice owes much to Godwin‟s attempt – subsequent to 
the work‟s first edition – to replace a vocabulary drawn from the ethos of Rational 
Dissent with one more indebted to moral sense philosophy and the literature of 
sensibility.24 That the first edition thus required correction was, for Godwin, a direct 
consequence of its indebtedness to the Calvinism in which he had been reared. 
 The Enquiry concerning Political Justice I apprehend to be blemished principally 
by three errors. 1. Stoicism, or an inattention to the principle, that pleasure and pain are 
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the only bases upon which morality can rest. 2. Sandemanianism, or an inattention to 
the principle, that feeling, and not judgement, is the source of human actions. 3. The 
unqualified condemnation of the private affections...It will easily be seen how strongly 
these errors are connected with the Calvinist system, which had been so deeply 
wrought into my mind in early life, as to enable these errors long to survive the general 
system of religious opinions of which they formed a part.25  
Godwin‟s repudiation of this (“Calvinist”) celebration of the emotionally and socially 
detached ratiocinative individual also found its way into Godwin‟s most popular and 
enduring work, Things as They Are; or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams (1794).26 In 
this pioneering detective novel and psychological thriller Godwin stressed the extent to 
which Britain‟s corrupt legal and political system (“things as they are”) – as symbolised 
by the aristocratic Squire Falkland – conspired to persecute and occlude the individual 
seeker after truth and justice (Caleb Williams). It has also been noted that the novel 
deliberately, if covertly, engages with the Civil War period. Gary Kelly has emphasised 
Godwin‟s perception – and that of others on both sides of the political and ideological 
divide – of the profound parallels existing between England in the 1790s and in the 
1640s and 1650s, that is, between the adherents of the “new philosophy” and the 
radicals of the Interregnum.27 Burke, for one, found the Dissenters‟ identification with the 
French revolutionaries quite in keeping with their descent from puritan regicides and 
republicans.28 Kelly details Godwin‟s conscious exploitation of this Civil War connection 
in the novel through the use of particular names. Falkland‟s historical namesake, Lucius 
Cary, the second Viscount Falkland was a “gallant cavalier martyr” of the Civil Wars 
renowned for his high sense of personal honour. The surname Williams was that of two 
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men, John and Roger, both persecuted for their resistance to Archbishop Laud's 
“papist” reforms of the state church, and both of whom figured highly in the unofficial 
pantheon of Nonconformist saints. Kelly justly insists that Caleb Williams “was, from the 
evidence of the nature and names of its characters, an allegory of Protestant, not to say 
Dissenting history: the struggle for truth and for liberty, and the continual risk of incurring 
for that reason all the horrors of intolerance, persecution and civil strife.”29 While it is 
usual and appropriate to read the novel as a critique of the myriad ways in which 
established power structures oppress the individual, it can also be interpreted as an 
indictment of the excesses of “Protestant” individualism and intellectual autonomy and 
thus as part of Godwin‟s 1790s revisionism.30 Indeed, contrary to the general tone of 
Political Justice, the novel reveals Godwin‟s revised view that rather than fostering 
justice and sociability, intellectual autonomy and the pursuit and disclosure of truth are 
more likely to promote social dissension and personal alienation.31  
While never abandoning his belief that Protestantism marked “the dawn of intellectual 
liberty to man”,32 Godwin was increasingly aware of the dangers associated with 
“Protestant” autonomy in general and with the epistemological and moral shortcomings 
of Calvinism in particular. The most elaborate and unequivocal statement of his disquiet 
with this Calvinist legacy occurs in Life of Geoffrey Chaucer (1803).33 In this cultural and 
intellectual history of the fourteenth century, Godwin explicitly reassessed the value of 
traditional political institutions, arguing that feudal inequality and mutual obligation 
contributed markedly to the development of modern sociability. He additionally 
proposed that the medieval Catholic Church, in its emphasis on ritual and the sensual, 
non-rational acquisition and expression of religious sentiment, was similarly productive 
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of benevolence and social solidarity. At the same time, significantly, Life of Chaucer 
emphasized deleterious aspects of what Godwin designated the “puritan temper” – a 
tendency to rational individualism, emotional detachment and immaterialism.34  
As a consequence of the general conservative reaction in Britain and, to a large extent, 
of his extremely frank biography of his recently-deceased wife Mary Wollstonecraft, 
Godwin became notorious as an unpatriotic advocate of revolutionism, rationalism and 
atheism.35 While Life of Chaucer went some way toward restoring his reputation, with 
the publication of the novel Fleetwood: or, The New Man of Feeling (1805), Godwin 
finally passed beyond redemption.36 So offensive to polite sensibilities was Godwin‟s 
reputation that, when forced by financial difficulties to go into business as a writer and 
publisher of children‟s books, he was constrained to write under a variety of 
pseudonyms.37 The decade after the publication of Fleetwood was, by Godwin‟s own 
admission, an extremely difficult period creatively. He later noted that whatever 
popularity he had enjoyed as a novelist reveals the extent to which the ideas informing 
these writings reflected those of the public. Against this popularity, he contrasted the 
relatively poor reception of those of his recent writings which he had “written merely 
from a private sentiment”, that is, without an eye to public taste. The first of these works 
was his Essay on Sepulchres (1809) in which he asserted the Burkean notion that moral 
progress and a sense of community depended upon an intimate, pseudo-biological 
relationship with our ancestors; the second was his Lives of Milton’s Nephews.38 
In Lives of Milton’s Nephews, Godwin undertakes to demonstrate the egregious moral 
and intellectual qualities of Puritan republicanism. He argues that Milton‟s political and 
poetic work display an unparalleled originality and integrity, and considers Paradise Lost 
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possibly the greatest poem ever written.39 Milton is presented as a paradigm of 
Godwinian man – an ideal creature possessed of benevolence, intellectual 
independence and true piety, as well as the literary ability to encourage others to 
emulate these qualities.40 Study of Milton‟s exceptional character is instructive, Godwin 
believes, not for what it tells us about human nature as it is, but for the way in which his 
ideal example can inspire us productively to reform or reconstruct humanity.  
As noted above, conservative denigration of seventeenth century republicanism and 
Puritanism intensified in the radical and revolutionary atmosphere of the 1790s; and it 
was maintained in the first two decades of the nineteenth century by fears of French 
imperial expansion and by government repression of radical and libertarian movements. 
During this period, historical discussion of the Interregnum appears to have been driven 
entirely off the respectable agenda. Dwight A. Culler notes that not until George 
Brodie‟s History of the British Empire (1822), and Macaulay‟s essay on Milton (1825), 
did a view of the events, contrary to the still hugely influential conservatism of Hume‟s 
The History of England, achieve any kind of public credibility.41 Understandably, then, 
Godwin‟s approach to the history of the mid-seventeenth century in Lives of Milton’s 
Nephews met with little success; and his shift of focus and genre in Mandeville 
illustrates his intention to appeal to an audience having little sympathy with, or interest 
in, the culture and character of puritan republicanism. In Mandeville, then, Godwin 
delays discussion of the republican Puritans of the seventeenth century in order to focus 
on their Presbyterian and royalist counterparts. 
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II 
The misanthrope Charles Mandeville is born in Ireland in 1638, and at the age of three 
witnesses a massacre of Protestants by Catholics. As the sole survivor of this traumatic 
event, he is taken to England where he is reared by his uncle Audley and a tutor, the 
Reverend Hilkiah Bradford, a learned, sincere and pious man whose only fault is a 
bigotry towards Roman Catholicism so intense that it borders on insanity.42 After 
Bradford‟s death Mandeville is sent to Winchester school where he encounters Clifford 
– a boy of great charm, courage, intelligence and popularity. Although initially 
spellbound by Clifford, Mandeville comes to envy him. He also believes Clifford‟s 
character to be superficial and morally suspect by comparison with his own more sober 
and sombre virtues which, to his annoyance, receive none of the commendation and 
adulation showered by his schoolfellows on Clifford.43 After studies at Oxford, 
Mandeville attempts to join a royalist plot to restore the King. He is proposed as 
secretary to the commander-in-chief of this operation, but is beaten to the post by 
Clifford who is more favored on account of the commanding officer‟s preference for 
Episcopalians over Presbyterians.44 Mandeville‟s disapprobation of Clifford intensifies 
into implacable hatred and mental instability upon the latter‟s conversion to Catholicism 
and development of affection for Mandeville‟s sister, Henrietta. Mandeville attempts to 
stop the marriage of Henrietta and Clifford by kidnapping his sister; yet she is rescued 
by Clifford who in a sword fight permanently marks the face of Mandeville. At this point 
the novel abruptly concludes.45  
B. J. Tysdahl remarks that the permanent scarring of Mandeville‟s face exemplifies the 
extent to which his character is the product of social and historical conditioning: he is an 
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individual “maimed by the march of history”.46 Misanthropic individuals recur in Godwin‟s 
fiction, usually as illustrative of his fundamental epistemological conviction that “the 
characters of men originate in their external circumstances”.47 While a misanthropic 
personality like that of Bethlem Gabor in the novel St Leon (1799) is shown to derive 
from adverse, uniquely personal circumstances48, the eponymous protagonist of 
Mandeville is depicted as the product of circumstances shared by a large segment of 
the seventeenth century British population. Mandeville is an “unflinching exploration of a 
Calvinist nurture”49 specially tinctured with anti-Catholicism. Mandeville‟s memories of 
the Irish massacre were, he claims, “all the world to me”; and it is a world consequently 
divided into polar opposites, “the Papist and the Protestant” which he conceives “like 
two great classes of animal nature”.50 This exclusivistic and vehement anti-Catholicism 
ultimately becomes the sole means by which the misanthropic Mandeville defines 
himself. 
Like Life of Chaucer, Mandeville illustrates Godwin‟s growing appreciation of the 
capacity of traditional aristocratic society (and its religious analogues) to foster solidarity 
and the production of those personal moral qualities which, in his earlier writings, he 
had associated solely with democracy. While he is keen to laud the achievements and 
tendencies of traditional aristocratic and monarchic society, he nonetheless makes a 
decisive distinction between the Episcopalian royalism of Clifford and the Presbyterian 
royalism of Mandeville. For Clifford is a “creature of the affections”, and possesses a 
spontaneity and ingenuousness quite at odds with the more reserved, guarded and 
ultimately misanthropic Mandeville (man-devil).51 Moreover, the fundamental incapacity 
of Mandeville‟s puritan religiosity to foster solidarity is evident in his reflections on the 
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philosophies of, respectively, his Anglican sister, Henrietta and his preceptor, Bradford: 
“hers was a religion of love: his was a religion of hatred.”52 The distinctive and superior 
sociability of Anglican royalism is made explicit upon Mandeville‟s visit to Henrietta and 
her companions at Beaulieu Cottage. 
 Every thing I saw was amiable; and I threw myself without apprehension into the 
arms of every one I met. Every thing I saw was frank, and easy, and communicative, 
and sensitive, and sympathetic. It was like the society of “just men made perfect”, where 
all sought the good of all, and no one lived for himself, or studied for himself.53 
Illustrating the extent to which Godwin had moved philosophically and 
historiographically, this royalist, Anglican community closely approximates the millennial 
commonwealth of sincerity, frankness and benevolence which was the essence of early 
Godwinian anarchism, itself the logical outcome of the Puritan religious tradition.54 
Although secluded, Beaulieu evidences a beauty that is in every way continuous with 
the natural landscape around it, and sympathetic both to that natural world and the 
world of humanity.55 In contrast, Mandeville‟s home and its surrounds are both barren 
and desolate, qualities which reflect the human emotions and relations of the 
inhabitants.56 And in lamenting the fact that he “belonged to no one…[and] hung loose 
upon society…”57, Mandeville is drawn to question what the outcome of his life and 
character may have been had he grown up at Beaulieu, rather than at Mandeville 
House.    
 I also should have been a member of a community, I should have lived with my 
fellow mortals on peaceful terms, I should have been as frank, as I now was invincibly 
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reserved, suspicious, and for ever disposed to regard my neighbor with thoughts of 
hostility! I should then have been amiable; and I should have been happy! But my fate 
was determined, and my character was fixed.58 
While the reader is encouraged to believe that Mandeville‟s unsociable character could 
have been avoided had he experienced such an environment, that is, had he 
experienced a very different personal history, Godwin‟s main intention is to reveal the 
broader cultural and historical assumptions which render individuals able to participate 
so fully and effectively in community life. Significantly, there is a direct and intimate 
human connection between this Anglican backwater and the medieval Catholic past. 
Mandeville observes that the district‟s ruined (Catholic) Abbey was still used as a parish 
church and the residence of one of the district‟s “best families”. 
These circumstances took away the feeling of desolation, which usually 
accompanies a heap of ruins; and the recollection of the devotion, the habits, and the 
vast undertakings of past ages, was pleasingly mingled with the neatness, the activity, 
and the civilization, that continued to occupy the scene.59 
The ruined Abbey specifically recalls the Tudor attempt to divorce the English people 
from their Catholic heritage. In Essay on Sepulchres Godwin proposed the Reformation 
under Henry VIII, and in particular the dissolution of the monasteries, as evidence of a 
deleterious human tendency to recreate the present through the destruction of the past: 
“This was signally a period, in which a plot was laid to abolish the memory of the things 
that had been, and to begin the affairs of the human species afresh.”60 In Life of 
Chaucer, Godwin similarly castigated this endeavor to cut the English people loose of 
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their historical and cultural moorings through the “indiscriminate ruin of hoary and 
venerable establishments”.61 It was, he averred, “Henry VIII, the worse than Vandal of 
our English story, [who] destroyed the habitations and the memorials which belonged to 
our ancient character, and exerted himself to the best of his power to make us forget we 
ever had ancestors.”62 Part of Godwin‟s intention in Life of Chaucer was to emphasize 
how a proper historical attitude can enable that capacity for empathetic identification 
with radically different others which is the essence of social solidarity in the present.63 
For Godwin, then, Burke‟s warning that “people will not look forward to posterity, who 
never look backward to their ancestors”64 has resonances far beyond the dangers of de 
novo social or political reform. In Mandeville, Godwin suggests that without a conscious, 
respectful and sympathetic acceptance of our respective pasts, there can be no human 
solidarity in the present. As Paul Westover puts it, “sympathy with the dead underwrites 
community”.65 Mandeville‟s unequivocal rejection of Catholicism precludes such 
communitas, and is the basis of his misanthropy and, ultimately, his insanity.66 
Mandeville is, after all, mad. Yet he is sane enough continually to adduce his own 
conditioning as a sufficient cause of his misanthropy67, and of his own inability to alter 
the future trajectory of his life.68 This bespeaks a certain disingenuousness. 
Consciousness of the motives which cause us to act is an essential element of 
Godwinian moral theory as stated in Political Justice. Ideally, he insisted, “we should 
remove ourselves to the furthest distance from the state of mere inanimate machines, 
acted upon by causes of which they have no understanding.”69 
This is the true value and function of intellectual liberty: to choose from among the 
myriad environmental determinants which comprise us. And in his proposal that 
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maintaining the organic connection which exists between present and past is the surest 
guide to virtue, justice and social solidarity, Burke reminds us that this “inheritance” is 
ours to choose or (it is implied) reject.70 Our ties to the past are, thus, in “the spirit of 
philosophic analogy”,71 familial or biological, but are consciously chosen or created by 
us in this aspect. As Robert Pogue Harrison has demonstrated, superseding our 
“biocultural ancestry” through the “adoption” of “non-consanguine predecessors” is an 
existential, authenticating necessity – for individuals and for communities.72 If we are to 
act in sane and sociable ways, adverse personal and biocultural histories have to be 
consciously rejected and replaced by salutary, inclusive collective histories. Burke, who, 
uneasily at times, combined his personal heritage as an Irish Catholic with his 
membership of the Church of England, significantly espoused his fundamental religious 
commitment to “„Christianity at large‟”.73 Such a commitment is, for Mandeville, 
impossible. While his exclusivistic and bigoted religiosity and the geographical and 
social isolation of his upbringing are both determinants and emblems of his 
misanthropic character74, all proceed from a rejection of any broader historical 
connection to his contemporaries.  
The ethical and historical continuity of Anglicanism with Catholicism and the implacable 
opposition of both to Mandeville‟s puritanism is further symbolised in the relative ease 
with which Clifford converts to Rome. For Mandeville this is an act of unmitigated 
apostasy and material self-interest, for he believes Clifford to have converted solely in 
order to inherit the estate of a dying Catholic relation. Consequently, Clifford‟s apostasy 
makes him a slave to his senses, a “poor, senseless, grovelling wretch, who knows 
nothing but what he sees, and is affected by nothing but what feeds his appetites, or 
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pampers his vanity!”75 Unsurprisingly, Mandeville‟s denunciation of Clifford‟s putative 
sensuality reveals his immersion in that intensely Platonic and puritanical conception of 
reality and true religion which Godwin had condemned elsewhere in his revisionist 
writings.76 
 Religion is the most important of all things, the great point of discrimination that 
divides the man from the brute. It is our special prerogative, that we can converse with 
that which we cannot see, and believe in that the existence of which is reported to us by 
none of our senses. Such is the abstract and exalted nature of man. This it is that 
constitutes us intellectual, and truly entitles us to the denomination of reasonable 
beings. All that passes before the senses of the body, is a scenic exhibition…Invisible 
things are the only realities; invisible things alone are the things that remain.77  
Yet Mandeville is mistaken both about the crucial value of such sensuality and feeling 
as a motive for moral action and about the real object of Clifford‟s sensuality. For 
Clifford is not motivated by the prospect of financial gain, but is rather prey to his 
“compassion” for his relation; and it is after much deliberation that “the consideration of 
the old man‟s peace at last decided him”.78 Moreover, not only is Clifford‟s conversion 
determined by his “affectionate nature”, but there are good reasons for becoming a 
Catholic. Clifford‟s conversion is not solely an unthinking and impulsive act of 
benevolence devoid of informed deliberation; for he is also aided in his decision by the 
reasonableness of the Catholic faith as explained to him by a sincere, pious and 
intelligent priest.79 Contrary to the conventions of Protestant historiography, then, 
Catholicism is presented as a legitimate embodiment of “pure Christianity” – logically, 
morally and historically.  
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The priest, who resided as chaplain in the family, was a person of great integrity 
and simplicity of character. He was deeply read in the controversies between the two 
churches; and what with the superiority of his knowledge of the subject, the strength of 
his reasonings, the goodness of his heart, and the pure Christianity of his temper, 
Clifford found himself powerfully beset.80 
Godwin is not, however, insisting that Puritanism, broadly conceived, is incapable of 
producing social solidarity any more than he is suggesting that only Anglicanism and 
Roman Catholicism can effect this outcome. Rather, within the vexed political and 
religious context of early nineteenth century Britain, he is contending for a new polity 
rooted in common religious and cultural ground rather than in the seemingly 
interminable sectarian divisiveness characteristic of the long eighteenth century. At the 
same time, his foregrounding of an Anglo-Catholic Christianity as the cohering essence 
of British culture in Mandeville was undoubtedly a judicious approach to the 
Interregnum, given his continued, if undeserved, reputation as an atheistical Jacobin, 
continued antipathy to Dissent and the generally conservative tone of early nineteenth 
century political and moral discourse. This is not to suggest that Godwin‟s decision to 
target Mandevillian puritanism was in any way insincere or self-serving. Given his 
enduring conviction that Calvinism had damaged his own intellectual and moral 
development, it is unsurprising that he should attempt to expose the impact of that ethos 
on the culture generally. Yet, while Godwin saw the Calvinism in which he had been 
reared as one deleterious aspect of “puritanism”, he also retained a profound 
commitment to the religious, moral and political ideals of seventeenth century Puritan 
Independency from which he consciously derived his own position as a specifically 
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republican and rational Dissenter. Thus, when public antipathy to the Civil War period 
and puritan republicans began to subside in the 1820s, Godwin felt confident enough to 
undertake a major analysis of these most closely related of his intellectual forebears. 
III 
In splitting the Whigs into Foxite and Burkean factions, the French Revolution and the 
subsequent Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars did much to ensure Tory government 
in Britain over the decades of the early nineteenth century.  As the Whigs attempted to 
reassert themselves in the 1820s in the pursuit of Reform and Catholic Emancipation, 
they found it necessary to rethink the historical underpinnings of their own ideology. The 
continued opposition of the Crown and Tory Ultras to Emancipation in particular 
encouraged Whigs to seek a libertarian and reformist heritage less beholden to the 
monarchical and anti-Catholic traditions of 1689 and more sympathetic to the anti-
royalist libertarian precedent of the Commonwealth.81 Once the paranoiac fear of 
republican subversion engendered by the Napoleonic wars had subsided with victory 
over France, there appeared a gradual re-emergence of interest in the Civil War period 
and the publication of works of a Foxite and republican flavor.82 In his insightful study of 
Godwin‟s History of the Commonwealth, John Morrow notes, however, that both Whig 
and Tory examinations of the Civil War period at this time were limited merely to an 
“emotional identification [with] or rejection” of the protagonists of the period. Morrow 
insists that Godwin‟s revisionist history was exceptional in that it closely scrutinized the 
republican theory of government proposed by, and the personal characteristics of, the 
seventeenth century Commonwealthmen.83 Contrary to prevailing conservative opinion, 
Godwin declared that the Commonwealthmen were not fanatical, enthusiastic 
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revolutionaries, but individuals of outstanding perspicacity and integrity.84 In total 
contrast to the generally accepted version of events, moreover, Godwin held that the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 had established a morally bankrupt culture in which the 
ideals of, and opportunity for, a truly democratic and virtuous English polity were 
effectively extinguished.85 As Morrow delineates so helpfully, Godwin defends the 
activities of the Commonwealthmen in terms of the high moral imperatives of the 
republic of virtue they sought to implement and explains the republic‟s failure in terms of 
the longevity of monarchical sentiments among the population. My subsequent analysis 
moves somewhat beyond Morrow‟s otherwise fulsome exposition of the History of the 
Commonwealth in drawing attention to Godwin‟s stress on the religious determinants 
and implications of the Interregnum. 
For Godwin, the events of the 1640s and 1650s must be viewed as a series of 
contentions among conflicting interpretations of the Reformation and its implications for 
religiosity, morality and political life. In the first place, contention existed between 
Episcopalian royalists and the Puritan Parliamentary majority opposed both to the 
despotic tendencies of Charles I and the Popish ceremonialism of his Archbishop, 
William Laud.86 Godwin remarks how the Laudian Church of England – in contrast to the 
Puritan faith professed by the majority of the nation at this time – “was not conformable 
to the spirit in which the Reformation had commenced”. This was reflected in the 
general motivation and character of its adherents. Anglicanism, he insists, was the 
creed of those, on the one hand, who “valued religion principally as an instrument of 
policy”, and others who, while sincere, followed their political masters simply “from the 
prejudices of education and habit.” For Godwin, the true spirit of the Reformation 
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existed only where religion functioned as the conscious, animating principle of 
intellectual and moral existence. Such persons, from the commencement of the 
Reformation, were, he adds, “almost universally of the puritan party”.87 
Initially, seventeenth century English Puritans were united in a desire to root out the 
supposedly corrupt doctrinal and liturgical accretions of Romish and Anglican worship 
and return to the simplicity, purity and moral fervor of Christ and the Early Church.88 Yet 
inevitably, Godwin opines, these Puritans split around 1643 into the “more cautious and 
unadventuring” Presbyterians who favored a limited monarchy and the “bolder and more 
adventurous” Independents who pursued a republic. Again, this was fundamentally a 
religious division between those advocating the primacy of “religious unity on one side, 
and integrity of conscience on the other.”89 The Presbyterians desired merely a 
reformed national church backed by an appropriately puritan and constitutionally-
constrained monarch. In particular, they opposed the tendency to heterodoxy and 
schism which they believed would invariably be produced in the absence of an 
established ecclesiastical authority.90 For the truly reformist, republican Puritans, 
however, religion could never be expressed in conformity or deference to any authority 
other than individual conscience.91 In contrast, then, to the “narrow and exclusive 
system of religion”92 embraced by the Presbyterians, the Independents saw true religion 
as a free and conscious acceptance of, and alignment to, a universal and objective 
moral order which was, Godwin intimates, only incidentally Christian.93 Unlike those 
Puritans who saw the reform of religion simply as a return to the sentiments “of Christ 
and his apostles”, the republicans intuited that the cause of true religion was hampered 
by the antipathy of Gospel or Early Christianity to independence.  
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 It may be doubted however, whether the humiliation and self-abasement of a 
primitive Christian, be a better thing than the lofty and soaring and independent  spirit 
of a genuine republican, inspired with a sober confidence in his own resources, and little 
disposed to think of himself more humbly than the truth would bear him out. Such a man 
owns no one for his superior that is not above him in virtues and talents; and, even in 
the presence of such a one, does not forget what is due to his own claims, as a thinking 
being endowed with the attributes of morality and conscience.94  
For the Independents, then, the logical consequence of true religiosity was a radically 
new and advanced form of society in which virtue and solidarity were compatible with, 
and indeed, depended upon, moral and intellectual autonomy. Yet although the majority 
of English people favored Puritanism, conceived as an anti-Romish reform of the 
national church, most did not accept the republican logic which proposed the evolution 
of religiosity into a new secular political ethic.95 In Life of Chaucer, Godwin described 
how the Commonwealthmen‟s radical and “puritan” forebear, John Wycliffe, was 
similarly intent upon inculcating a new, progressive moral and intellectual character with 
which the majority of his contemporaries were unsympathetic.96 At the same time, like 
the seventeenth century republicans, Wycliffe believed himself to be allied to the cause 
of truth and progress, and consequently acting in accordance with a moral imperative 
demanding its expression.97 Yet both sets of puritans failed in their efforts to advance an 
evolved religiosity through an inadequate understanding of the fact that human beings 
are fundamentally sensual and emotional, rather than intellectual, creatures who are 
motivated, for the most part, by habit, custom and tradition rather than by reason.98  
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From as early as 1653 the republicans were effectively excluded from influence in the 
events of the time, and Godwin‟s attention consequently shifts to the puissance, 
longevity and positive moral force of royalist conservatism. If Godwin‟s 
Commonwealthmen were convinced that their grasp of religion‟s essence necessitated 
a republican future, their opponents rejected republicanism with an equally passionate 
assertion of the sanctity of tradition. 
 [They]…were thoroughly persuaded that there was a sacred right, a right of 
prescription and indefeasibleness belonging to the preceding government, which  it was 
the highest virtue in them at all times to assert, and to seek to restore. They clung to it, 
not for its abstract fitness and beauty, but because it had descended to them from their 
ancestors, and because it was English. It was difficult to contend with such men, and all 
but impossible to suppress them.99 
In her study of Lives of Milton’s Nephews, Tillotama Rajan has argued that, in his 
biographical, fictional and historical expositions of the mid-seventeenth century, Godwin 
displays a consistent refusal to directly address the issue of puritan republicanism, 
believing that this was “a period whose potential can be grasped only obliquely and 
through a negative dialectic.”100 While Rajan says little about Mandeville and the History 
of the Commonwealth, there is much to commend her generalization. For she also 
reminds us that Godwin made a stark distinction between the “moral” of a literary work 
and its “tendency”. While the former denotes the intended lesson which might be 
abstracted from the text, the latter designates the “actual effect” of the work on the 
reader, an effect of which authors are themselves frequently ignorant and which “cannot 
be completely ascertained but by the experiment”.101 Godwin‟s avowed intention in the 
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History of the Commonwealth was to celebrate the moral and intellectual genius of the 
republicans; yet the overwhelming impression or lesson imparted – the “tendency” of 
the work, perhaps – is that radical change, however enlightened and far-sighted it might 
be, is seldom a match for the inveterate conservatism of the mass of humankind. 
 Government is founded in opinion: and the sentiments and prejudices of a 
greater or smaller portion of its subjects form its basis…In the second place, opinion 
depends very much on prescription. So much as our forefathers believed, the creed,  
religious or political, which they handed down to us, we are inclined to entertain.102  
The foundation of government in public opinion was a central tenet of Political Justice 
and substantively informed Godwin‟s underappreciated insistence on the immorality and 
impracticality of revolutionary political change.103 While his later writings are more likely 
to identify prescription, rather than reason, as the basis of opinion, Godwin remains 
dubious about the ethics of forcible political change. In History of the Commonwealth, 
he continually downplays the revolutionary nature of the republicans‟ activity, insisting 
that, in exceeding his prerogative, the King had created a revolutionary situation which 
the republicans then inherited and attempted to manage according to their more 
evolved political lights.104 In stressing the moderation, integrity and public spirit of the 
seventeenth century Puritan republicans, Godwin provides mainstream Britain with a 
timely reminder that Protestant Nonconformity cannot uniformly be categorized as 
unpatriotic and revolutionary. At the same time, the failure of the Puritan experiment 
also offers a practical lesson for would be reformers of the early nineteenth century: 
“...the English intellect and moral feeling were probably not sufficiently ripe for a 
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republican government: it may be, that a republican government would at no time be a 
desirable acquisition for the people of this country.”105  
IV 
The seventeenth century English republic proved a bold but doomed experiment in 
forming a polity based on moral and intellectual independence. This attempt to marry 
independence and sociability was a central (though often overlooked) objective of 
Political Justice, as Godwin asserted in that work‟s first paragraph.106 Godwin‟s failure to 
achieve this objective in his magnum opus owed much to his assumption of an 
immaterialist, emotionally and socially disengaged, “puritan” conception of human 
nature.107 The character of Mandeville leaves the reader in no doubt as to Godwin‟s 
assessment of the epistemological and moral shortcomings of this puritan essentialism. 
If the Commonwealthmen‟s more evolved puritanism – in essence, a post-religious 
republicanism – proved an ideal beyond the capacity (and taste) of contemporary 
humanity, then Mandeville‟s emotionally arid and sensually detached Calvinism is rather 
more roundly and unequivocally condemned for its irremediable asociality. Yet, 
Mandeville‟s misanthropy derives not only from his specifically puritan epistemology, but 
more importantly, perhaps, from the fundamentally xenophobic construction of his 
Protestant identity. In this, he may be regarded as caricaturing the eighteenth century 
Protestant British national identity described so lucidly by Linda Colley.108 Given the 
current state of “English intellect and moral feeling”, unevolved, perhaps, from the 
seventeenth century, the best solution to Godwin‟s central political dilemma appears to 
be the Anglo-Catholic ideal expressed in Mandeville. Such a Burkean commitment to 
Christianity in general underlines Godwin‟s continued sensitivity to the ever-apparent 
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and damaging sectarianism of British life in the decades prior to Catholic Emancipation 
and the Repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts. It also lends credence to Michael 
Scrivener‟s recent assertion that a cosmopolitan ideal characteristic of the 
Enlightenment persisted throughout a period generally considered to have been 
overwhelmingly populated with Romantic nationalisms.109 Most significantly, perhaps, it 
prefigures Godwin‟s later, intriguing assessment that religious sentiment was essential 
to the reconciliation of personal independence and social solidarity.110  
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